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ABSTRACT: Margin squeeze occurs where the margin between the price charged by a 
vertically integrated firm for a wholesale input, and its own retail price for the end 
product incorporating the input, is so low as to foreclose one or more affected markets.  
The extent to which margin squeeze should constitute a discrete competition law offence, 
distinct from predation or refusal to deal, is a disputed question.  A jurisprudential chasm 
between the approaches to margin squeeze under European Union competition law and 
United States antitrust has emerged, following the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’s judgments in Deutsche Telekom and TeliaSonera and the US Supreme Court’s 
decision in LinkLine.  The EU recognises a broad concept of margin squeeze, applicable 
in any sector; the US does not recognise margin squeeze as a standalone abuse, and 
moreover, the presence of sector-specific regulation excludes the application of antitrust 
to the price levels that comprise the squeeze.  This paper explores the margin squeeze 
concept, with particular attention to both areas of contention. 
 
 
 
Protection of competition not competitors is the accepted wisdom behind the competition rules.  To 
what extent, however, may a vertically integrated dominant firm be liable for failure to protect its 
competitors’ profit margins, where this in turn harms competition?  That is, in effect, the problem 
posed by margin squeeze.  This paper examines the margin squeeze concept and its relationship to 
sector-specific economic regulation in three dimensions: theory, practice and policy implications. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  Part II sets out the basic theory of margin squeeze; explains how 
such a practice may raise problems from a competition perspective; and describes how the abuse has 
been accommodated under the competition rules.  Part III examines the case law on margin squeeze 
within the European Union (EU), from its first mention in the Napier Brown Commission decision, to 
the recent Court of Justice judgments in the Deutsche Telekom appeal and the TeliaSonera reference 
case.  Given the apparently opposite answers of United States courts when faced with broadly similar 
questions, the US jurisprudence on the issue of margin squeeze is also considered.  Part IV of the 
paper considers the impact of sector-specific regulation on margin squeeze as a principle of 
competition law, considering in particular the policy issues that arise from the concurrency approach 
adopted under current EU law.  Part V of the paper concludes. 
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II: The Theory of Margin Squeeze 
 
Margin squeeze is a problem that can arise where a firm is organised with a degree of vertical 
integration, meaning that it operates at two or more levels of the supply chain.  Microeconomic theory 
posits that economic operators vertically integrate in circumstances where this is the most efficient 
manner in which to organise their businesses, with the result that consumer welfare as a whole is 
maximised.  Thus, vertical integration is not an a priori problem, and indeed generally brings 
beneficial efficiencies of scale and scope to the firm’s operations.3 
 
Where, however, the vertically integrated firm sells part of its wholesale level production to a non-
integrated firm that competes with it at the downstream level, the integrated firm gains a measure of 
control over its competitor’ costs—which can be significant, particularly where there is no alternative 
source of supply for the input available to the downstream competitor, for example where there is a 
“bottleneck monopoly” at the wholesale level.  Moreover, where the integrated firm also holds a 
dominant market position downstream, its ability to influence prices in that market means that it can 
also exert control over its competitor’s revenues.  Thus, the integrated firm may have the ability to 
manipulate, or “squeeze”, the relationship between the competitor’s costs and revenues in order to 
reduce its profit margin to such a low (or negative) level as to force the competitor from the market.4  
Figure 1 below illustrates this vertical price relationship in graphical form. 
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Figure 1: Vertical Margin Squeeze 
 
Does a margin squeeze harm competition in the market, or does it merely diminish the competing 
firm’s profits?  Critics of margin squeeze attack it as being “an antitrust rule that punishes a firm for 
failing to ensure its competitors’ profitability.”5  They argue that prohibiting margin squeeze simply 
leads to a wealth transfer from the vertically integrated firm to its downstream competitor, with no 
increase in consumer welfare, and moreover, can have a negative impact on the investment and 
competition incentives of the dominant firm.  In addition, where the remedy for a squeeze is to 
increase retail prices to consumers, as is in fact expressly permitted under EU law, consumers lose out 
both directly as a result of higher prices and indirectly because of the negative impact on competition 
in the marketplace. 
 
Moreover, there are those who argue that a margin squeeze will never (or at least rarely) be a rational 
strategy for an integrated firm: even though the firm would gain by acquiring more customers at the 
retail level from excluding its rivals, it would still lose out because of reduced profits at the wholesale 
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level, where it has lost the customers of its wholesale product.  This argument is tied to the notion that 
there is but “one monopoly profit” for the vertically integrated firm.6 
 
Nonetheless, a plausible theory of competition harm (and corresponding benefit for the integrated 
firm) resulting from margin squeeze can be constructed.  Firstly, exclusion of the rival from the 
downstream market reduces competition at that level, thus reducing the level of competitive pressure 
on the integrated firm to maintain lower prices and/or higher product quality.  For those who view the 
maximisation of consumer welfare as the sole objective of competition law, a diminution in 
competition may not be seen as a problem where it does not result in an overall diminution in 
welfare.7  For those who see competition law as a tool by which to protect the competition process, 
however, loss of competitors can greatly impair the proper functioning of the market mechanism.8 
 
Secondly, even if the rival does not exit the downstream market, the squeeze may prevent it from 
climbing the ladder of investment; that is, integrating upstream into the dominant firm’s primary 
market.9  If the rival can develop its own upstream infrastructure, the bottleneck problem disappears, 
negating the possibility that a margin squeeze can arise in future and probably the need for economic 
regulation of the market.  However, the existence of the margin squeeze prevents the rival from 
having sufficient revenues to fund and/or sufficient downstream market share to justify such 
investment. 
 
Thirdly, the margin squeeze may also limit the rival’s incentive to innovate within the downstream 
market, insofar as any cost saving the rival makes as a result of greater efficiency will be captured by 
the dominant firm via the squeeze.  This results in consumer harm because it prevents the emergence 
of a more efficient downstream market.10 
 
The Telefónica decision provides a good example of the related ways in which foreclosure via margin 
squeeze can be a rational, profitable strategy for a dominant firm.  In this case, the Commission found 
that cross-subsidies from the high retail prices that Telefónica could maintain through foreclosure of 
the downstream market surpassed by far the foregone profits at the retail level; Telefónica was able to 
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protect its dominant position in adjacent retail markets; and it was perfectly position to also pre-empt 
emerging retail markets in new technologies.11  At the same time, the lack of competition in the 
downstream market meant that Spain had among the highest average prices for retail broadband in the 
EU, and below-average broadband penetration rates.  Thus, Telefónica maintained its dominance and 
consumers suffered due to few users and higher prices.  
 
Margin Squeeze and Competition Law 
 
The principal focus of this paper is an analysis of the treatment of margin squeeze cases under current 
competition jurisprudence, firstly in the EU, with a comparative assessment of the approach under US 
antitrust law.  Particular consideration is given to the question of the application of the margin 
squeeze concept, as a principle of competition law, in sectors already subject to sector-specific 
regulation.  Before we consider the specifics of the approaches in the two jurisdictions under 
examination, however, it is worthwhile giving some thought, more generally, to how price squeezing 
behaviour fits within the established competition law framework. 
 
Although a vertically integrated firm may, legally, comprise a number of separate companies, the 
group of companies as a whole typically constitutes a single economic unit.  Therefore, the 
competition rules on unilateral conduct are the appropriate starting point for our assessment.  In the 
EU, Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)12 prohibits the 
“abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a 
substantial part of it”, insofar as this affects trade between Member States.  In the US, §2 of the 
Sherman Act prohibits monopolisation, attempts to monopolise and conspiracies to monopolise trade.  
While the market share threshold for the application of Article 102 TFEU is significantly lower than 
that required for the application of §2 of the Sherman Act, the latter provision covers the 
anticompetitive acquisition as well as maintenance of a monopoly, whereas at least according to the 
letter of the law Article 102 TFEU covers only the abuse of an existing position of dominance.  For 
the purposes of this paper, however, we shall assume that the core of each provision is broadly 
equivalent: prohibiting anticompetitive behaviour by firms holding substantial market power. 
 
How might a margin squeeze be construed as a unilateral conduct abuse?  Firstly, there are those that 
would exclude circumstances leading to a margin squeeze from the purview of competition law 
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entirely.  Rather, the argument is that such behaviour is more appropriately dealt with under the 
economic principles on access pricing.  Thus, the wholesale level price (and possibility also the 
downstream price) should be set by a regulator at a level that maximises consumer welfare, the 
assumption being that in the market concerned the operation of the market mechanism will not result 
in a socially optimal pricing scheme.13  A key consideration for those favouring the regulatory 
approach is the presumed superiority of regulators in addressing competition issues within their area 
of special expertise, when compared to generalist competition law enforcers.14  On the other hand, 
sector-specific regulation and competition law seek to achieve different objectives with respect to 
competition—broadly, promoting versus policing competition, respectively—a distinction that may 
justify a different economic treatment of margin squeeze under each approach,15 and which therefore 
suggests that subsuming antitrust considerations within access pricing is not the optimum solution. 
 
Secondly, even where it is admitted that margin squeeze behaviour may be examined under the 
competition rules, opinion is divided as to whether a margin squeeze should constitute a standalone 
cause of action, or whether it should instead be fitted into existing competition law standards.  The 
latter position is supported by the argument that competition law should treat economically-equivalent 
actions in an identical manner, and that many if not all forms of conduct by which a margin squeeze 
can arise are already captured by existing competition law prohibitions.16    
 
Thus, some commentators treat margin squeeze as a form of refusal to deal,17 an approach that focuses 
principally on the wholesale prices charged by the vertically integrated firm.  Under this view, the 
dominant firm’s practice of charging a wholesale prices that does not allow the downstream 
competing firms to make sufficient profit (however one defines sufficiency) in view of the existing 
retail price amounts to a constructive refusal to deal, or a refusal to deal on commercially acceptable 
terms.  As an competition law abuse, however, refusal to deal is construed very narrowly—the default 
assumption being that even dominant firms are free to decide who they want to transact with and on 
what terms—so that an approach to margin squeeze that examines the behaviour solely through the 
lens of the refusal to deal principle is in practice a very restricted one. 
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Alternatively, margin squeeze may be characterised as a form of predation, that is, below cost pricing, 
sustained by the dominant firm for long enough to drive the competitor from the market.18  Colley & 
Burnside favour this approach on the basis that, under both predation and margin squeeze, the 
dominant firm incurs incremental losses (in the latter case, at least in the form of profits forgone).19  
As the Telefónica case demonstrates, however, margin squeeze cases can just as easily involve high 
wholesale and retail prices as low wholesale and retail levels.  Moreover, the test for predatory pricing 
test, which assumes that predation is an inherently unsustainable policy insofar as no firm can lose 
money forever, may not capture fully the vertical element of margin squeeze.  Vertical integration and 
cross-subsidisation means that margin squeeze contains a built-in mechanism by which the integrated 
firm can sustain the otherwise unsustainable.20    
 
It is this vertical aspect of margin squeeze that prompts other commentators to argue that it should 
constitute a standalone abuse, on the basis that examination of each price level separately for evidence 
of a discrete abuse fails to take account of the dominant firm’s ability to engage in vertical 
leveraging.21  The issue then becomes one of determining what level of a squeeze between wholesale 
and retail prices should be prohibited—how “unfair”, “inadequate”, “inappropriate” or 
“disproportionate” the relationship between these prices must be,22 and more importantly, how this is 
to be measured, objectively and efficiently.23 
 
Some would go beyond even an economics-based standalone test for margin squeeze.  Lopatka, who 
was in fact sceptical of the logic of a quantitative margin squeeze test in the presence of price 
regulation, argued that dominant firms should instead be liable for deliberate abusive conduct in the 
regulatory price-setting process.  Conversely, a margin squeeze that arises as a result of regulatory 
inconsistency would not be actionable.24  On the other hand, Dogan & Lemley, who have argued that 
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competition law should be used to address other forms of regulatory gaming such as patent hopping, 
see margin squeeze as the limit to this approach: where there is detailed regulation already in place, 
the costs of antitrust intervention begin to outweigh its benefits.25 
 
This latter point leads to an additional question: even where we recognise margin squeeze as a 
competition law abuse (either as a standalone offence or where the component prices constitute 
discrete examples of other established offences such as predation or refusal to deal), to what extent 
does the existence of ex ante sector-specific economic regulation in the market impact upon, or even 
prevent, the ex post application of competition law to the price squeeze behaviour?  This question is 
linked to broader policy considerations regarding the intersection between competition law and 
economic regulation more generally, but it has a particular significance in the margin squeeze context.  
As noted, many margin squeeze cases arise in sectors where there is a bottleneck monopoly at the 
wholesale level—and it is the presence of such a monopoly that is, frequently, the impetus behind the 
implementation of economic regulation in the first place.  Thus, arguably, margin squeeze cases are in 
practice most likely to arise in sectors where there is existing regulation, meaning that the relationship 
between margin squeeze as a competition law and regulatory abuse merits special consideration.   
 
Bouckaert & Verboven, for example, argue that the presence, and degree, of economic regulation 
should impact on the treatment of margin squeeze on the basis that the regulatory environment 
determines the nature of the offence.26  Where there is full regulation at both the wholesale and retail 
levels, they argue that a squeeze is simply “an artefact of the regulatory system”,27 and therefore can 
only be addressed through the regulation in place.  Where there is price regulation at the wholesale 
but not the retail level, competition law can be applied to the unregulated retail price in the form of 
the test for predatory pricing, but not to the margin as such.  It is only where there is no regulation at 
either level that foreclosure via the margin itself becomes a problem—but even in such circumstances, 
competition law enforcement may not be the optimal tool to resolve the problem.  Rather, it may be 
better addressed through alternative solutions such as (re)regulation, facilities-based competition 
(although this is not always economically feasible) or structural separation of the vertically integrated 
firm.28  While this approach is merely one among many to the regulation/competition law interface in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Commission and the US Federal Trade Commission, concerning anticompetitive participation in a standard-
setting process, might provide some support for this approach, but unfortunately neither proceeding has resulted 
in a formal finding of breach: the EU proceedings were closed without a finding of abuse on receipt of 
behavioural commitments from the firm; the initial finding of breach by the FTC was annulled on appeal. 
25
 Dogan & Lemley (2009) at 723. 
26
 J. Bouckaert & F. Verboven, “Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment” (2004) 26(3) Journal of 
Regulatory Economics 321. 
27
 Bouckaert & Verboven (2004), at 334. 
28
 Structural separation of vertically integrated firms can provide a more enduring remedy to margin squeeze 
problems by separating the upstream and downstream activities of the firm, effectively disintegrating the 
integrated firm.  It is an interesting (and controversial) topic beyond the remit of this paper.  Detailed discussion 
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the margin squeeze context, it does illustrate the significant impact that regulation may have on both 
the policy and economics-focused issues.  This aspect will be discussed in detail in Part IV of the 
paper.  
 
III. Margin Squeeze: The Case Law 
 
Having considered the theory of margin squeeze, we shall now examine the development of the EU 
competition law jurisprudence on the issue, as well as outlining the current position.  The EU 
approach is compared to and contrasted with the far more restrictive US approach, a divergence that is 
particularly interesting in view of the close factual similarities between the cases that have arisen in 
both jurisdictions.  In particular, we shall examine two issues: (i) the extent to which margin squeeze 
constitutes a standalone competition law offence; and (ii) the impact of sector-specific regulation on 
margin squeeze as a competition law concept.  In both jurisdictions, as noted above, we are 
considering the position of the vertically integrated form under the rules relating to unilateral conduct, 
that is Article 102 TFEU and §2 of the Sherman Act. 
 
Margin Squeeze in the European Union 
 
The concept of margin squeeze as an abuse of dominance was first applied by the Commission in 
1988 in its Napier Brown – British Sugar decision.29  The case concerned a series of abusive practices 
carried out by the sole sugar beet producer in the UK, British Sugar.  This firm was active, inter alia, 
on the markets for the sale of granulated sugar in bulk quantities and individually packaged for retail 
sale in the UK, and was found by the Commission to hold a dominant position on both markets.  
When the UK’s largest sugar merchant, Napier Brown, attempted to enter the retail packet sugar 
market, by buying sugar in bulk from British Sugar and packaging itself, British Sugar retaliated with 
a series of sales practices designed to prevent Napier Brown from gaining a foothold in the 
downstream market, including refusals to supply, tying and fidelity rebates.  Among the alleged 
anticompetitive practices was the fact that British Sugar had cut its prices for retail packet sugar, 
thereby squeezing the margin between the wholesale cost of sugar in bulk and retail packet sugar 
prices.  The Commission took the view that a margin squeeze of this nature could amount to an abuse 
of dominance, in the circumstances: 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of the policy considerations involved can be found in OECD, Restructuring Public Utilities for Competition 
(2001).  A useful description of the degrees of separation that may be imposed is available in M. Cave, “Six 
Degrees of Separation: Operation Separation as a Remedy in European Telecommunications Regulation” 64 
Communications and Strategies (4th quarter 2006), p.1-15.  For an example of recent economic thinking on 
structural separation, see B. Moselle & D. Black, “Vertical Separation as an Appropriate Remedy” (2011) 2(1) 
Journal of Competition Law & Practice 84. 
29
 Commission Decision 88/518/EEC of 18 July 1988 relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty (Case No IV/30.178 Napier Brown – British Sugar) (OJ L 284/41, 19.10.1988). 
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The maintaining, by a dominant company, which is dominant in the markets for both 
a raw material and a corresponding derived product, of a margin between the price 
which it charges for a raw material to the companies which compete with the 
dominant company in the production of the derived product and the price which it 
charges for the derived product, which is insufficient to reflect that dominant 
company’s own costs of transformation…[]…with the result that competition in the 
derived product is restricted, is an abuse of dominant position.30 
 
Thus, the Commission established that the relevant measure of costs is an objective one: the as-
efficient competitor test, that is, British Sugar’s own costs, rather than those of its downstream 
competitors.  The standard by which those costs were to be assessed, however, was a rather nebulous 
one: the sufficiency of the margin in reflecting the cost of transformation between the wholesale and 
retail products.  On the facts, taking into account the evidence of intention to foreclose the retail sugar 
market, and coupled with the other abuses that British Sugar has committed, the Commission held that 
the margin squeeze constituted an abuse of dominance.31 
 
The possibility that a margin squeeze can amount to an abuse of dominance was later recognised by 
the then Court of First Instance (now General Court) in the Industries des Poudres Sphériques 
judgment,32 albeit no abuse was found on the circumstances.  Industries des Poudres Sphériques (IPS) 
was a French firm that manufactured that manufactured broken calcium metal from primary calcium 
metal.  It purchased the latter raw material from another French firm, Péchiney Électrométallurgie 
(PEM), which was also active in the broken calcium metal market.  IPS complained to the 
Commission, inter alia, that PEM’s pricing practices with respect to its primary calcium metal and 
broken calcium metal products, respectively, constituted an abuse of PEM’s alleged dominant 
position on the upstream market.  The Commission rejected the complaint against PEM in its entirety, 
and IPS appealed the rejection decision to the General Court.  In assessing the initial complaint 
submitted by IPS, the General Court described the potential abuse of margin squeeze in the following 
terms: 
Price squeezing may be said to take place when an undertaking which is in a 
dominant position on the market for an unprocessed product and itself uses part of 
its production for the manufacture of a more processed product, while at the same 
time selling off surplus unprocessed product on the market, sets the price at which it 
sells the unprocessed product at such a level that those who purchase it do not have a 
sufficient profit margin on the processing to remain competitive on the market for 
the processed product.33 
                                                     
30
 Napier Brown at paragraph 66, relying on the earlier Court of Justice decision in Case 6/72 Continental Can v 
Commission [1973] ECR 215. 
31
 The other abuses challenged in the decision contributed to the margin squeeze found on the facts.  British 
Sugar refused to supply bulk sugar apart from on an ex factory pricing basis, which included a charge for the 
delivery of the sugar from British Sugar’s factory to the customer’s premises.  Not only did this practice have 
the effect of reserving to British Sugar the separate but ancillary activity of delivery of the sugar, it also raised 
the wholesale cost of the sugar for any firm intending to transform the bulk sugar into packet sugar.   
32
 Case T-5/97Industries des Poudres Sphériques v Commission [2000[ ECR II-3755. 
33
 Industries des Poudres Sphériques at paragraph 178. 
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Thus, the Genera; Court followed the Commission’s approach in Napier Brown in adopting the 
sufficiency of the margin as the central concern.  Moreover, by focusing on the costs and revenues of 
the downstream competitor, rather than the dominant firm, the formulation in Industries des Poudres 
Sphériques appears, at first glance, to be more favourable to downstream competitors than the as-
efficient competitor test, insofar as it protects inefficient competitors in addition to as-efficient ones.  
Nonetheless, when it came to applying this formulation to the facts at hand, the CFI adopted a far 
more restrictive approach.  It held that, in the absence of abusive prices at the wholesale level (which 
would constitute a constructive refusal to deal) or predatory prices at the retail level, IPS had failed to 
raise facts that could constitute a breach of the competition rules.  In particular, the fact that IPS 
incurred higher processing costs did not justify characterising PEM’s pricing policy as abusive—
because a producer, even in a dominant position, is not obliged to sell its product below its 
manufacturing costs.34   
 
Another case of relevance in this context, albeit one that does not consider the issue of vertical margin 
squeeze directly, is the Deutsche Post decision of 2001.35  In this case, the Commission held that 
Deutsche Post, the incumbent postal operator in Germany, had abused its dominant position in the 
liberalised market for mail order parcel services in Germany, by setting predatory prices for those 
services that did not cover the incremental cost of their provision.  While the Commission applied the 
orthodox predatory pricing standards established in AKZO,36 the predation strategy was financed via 
cross-subsidies from the profitable letter-post market, where Deutsche Post held a legal monopoly of 
service.  While the case thus concerned horizontal rather than vertical related markets, it provides 
support for the proposition that a firm’s ability to cross-subsidise between profitable and losing-
making businesses can make a foreclosure strategy rational in the longer term.37  
 
Nonetheless, until recently the parameters of the margin squeeze concept as a unilateral conduct 
offence were somewhat unsettled within EU competition law: firstly, as to whether it can constitute a 
standalone competition abuse, in the absence of predation or refusal to deal; and secondly, as to the 
calculation of whether a margin is abusive on the facts.  These questions have been substantially 
clarified in two recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union dealing expressly and 
                                                     
34
 Industries des Poudres Sphériques at paragraph 179.  Note that, while IPS had higher processing costs than 
PEM, it ended up with a higher value final product, insofar as the broken calcium metal sold by IPS commanded 
a 25% premium on the prices charged for competing products; see Industries des Poudres Sphériques at 
paragraph 185. 
35
 Commission Decision 2001/354/EC of 20 March 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty (Case Comp/35.141 – Deutsche Post AG) (OJ L 125/27, 5.5.2001). 
36
 Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359. 
37
 See G.R. Faulhaber, “Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises” (1975) 65(5) American Economic 
Review 966-977 for a discussion on cross-subsidisation by integrated firms, in particular the impact on 
consumer welfare and the possibility of competitive entry. 
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at length with the issue of margin squeeze, namely Deutsche Telekom and TeliaSonera.  In these 
cases, the Court has recognised a very broad concept of margin squeeze as a standalone abuse, and 
moreover on that can arise in any circumstances, whether in a regulated sector, in the presence of an 
essential facility or in an otherwise competitive market. 
 
The Deutsche Telekom Judgment 
 
The Deutsche Telekom case emerged from the EU’s efforts to introduce competition at the retail level 
for telecommunications services in the EU, via mandatory unbundling requirements imposed on 
incumbent telecommunications operators in the Member States.  Deutsche Telekom (DT) is the 
formerly State-owned incumbent operator in Germany, which retains ownership of the fixed 
telephone network.  The German markets in the provision of infrastructure and telephone services 
have been liberalised since 1996, in line with EU law requirements, and DT has been subject to 
mandatory access requirements under national law since that date.  DT now provides, inter alia, retail 
telecommunications services to end users, as well as wholesale access to infrastructure services to 
non-integrated firms that compete with it in the downstream markets.  During the time period in 
question, in addition to the mandatory access requirements, DT was subject to price regulation at both 
the wholesale and retail levels.  The case against DT proceeded on the basis that, at the wholesale 
level, access charges were set by the national telecommunications regulator, while at the retail level, 
DT was subject to a price cap for “baskets” of services.38  The latter regulatory structure required that 
the aggregate price for each basket was not permitted to exceed a certain level, but gave DT discretion 
as to the pricing of individual component services within the basket, although any adjustment of these 
charges required authorisation from the regulator.   
 
By a decision of 2003, the Commission held that the spread between the wholesale and retail prices 
charged by DT for fully unbundled access to its local loops amounted to an abusive margin squeeze, 
contrary to what is now Article 102 TFEU.39  DT was considered to hold a dominant position in both 
the wholesale and retail access markets.  Once again, the as-efficient competitor standard was applied 
to determine the existence of an anticompetitive squeeze.40  This test established that the spread 
                                                     
38
 At the time in question, two “baskets” were established, one for services to residential customers and the other 
for services to business customers. 
39
 Commission Decision 2003/707/EC of 21 May 2003 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty (Case  COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579 – Deutsche Telekom AG) (OJ C 263/9, 14.10.2003).   
40
 See the Deutsche Telekom decision at paragraphs 107-108:  
“…there is an abusive margin squeeze if the difference between the retail prices charged by a dominant 
undertaking and the wholesale prices it charges its competitors for comparable services is negative, or 
insufficient to cover the product-specific costs to the dominant operator of providing its own retail 
services on the downstream market…[]...An insufficient spread between a vertically integrated 
dominant operator’s wholesale and retail charges constitutes anticompetitive conduct especially where 
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between DT’s average retail access price and its wholesale access price was always negative from the 
time when local loop unbundling became a legal obligation in Germany in 1998 up to the end of 2001.  
Given that DT had sufficient “commercial discretion” to avoid the squeeze by adjusting the retail 
prices within its price-capped baskets and in the absence of any objective justification the margin 
squeeze amounted to an abuse of dominance by DT.  A fine of €12.6 million was imposed for the 
violation, which included a lower basic amount to account for the relative novelty of the margin 
squeeze calculation and subsequent efforts by DT to reduce the squeeze, plus a 10% reduction to take 
account of the regulatory regime as a mitigating circumstance. 
 
DT appealed the 2003 decision to the CFI, where the Commission’s approach was largely affirmed.41  
DT further appealed that judgment to the Court of Justice, which in 14 October 2010 dismissed DT’s 
action in its entirety.42  Since the Court of Justice judgment essentially confirms the approach of the 
CFI, we shall focus on the more recent higher court judgment in determining the principles on margin 
squeeze emerging from the case. 
 
Firstly, the Court of Justice accepted that margin squeeze can, in itself, constitute an abuse of 
dominance contrary to Article 102 TFEU.  The abuse of margin squeeze is concerned with the 
unfairness of the spread between two vertically related prices.  Therefore, it is not necessary to 
establish, in addition, that either the wholesale or retail price is, independently of the claimed squeeze, 
excessive (thereby amounting to a constructive refusal to deal) or predatory.43  Moreover, the 
unfairness of a margin squeeze stems from its very existence rather than its precise spread.  The 
absolute values of the wholesale and retail prices are therefore irrelevant: margin squeeze relates 
instead to the relationship between these absolute values.44 
 
Secondly, the Court of Justice approved the use of the as-efficient competitor test in order to 
determine whether such a pricing spread breaches the competition rules, relying solely upon the 
dominant undertaking’s charges and costs, rather than the situation of its actual or potential 
competitors.  The Court took the view that, not only is such an approach consistent with general 
welfare considerations, insofar as it protects competition (in the form of as- or more efficient 
competitors) as opposed to less efficient competitors, it is moreover consistent with the general 
                                                                                                                                                                     
other providers are excluded from competition on the downstream market even if they are at least as 
efficient as the established operator.” 
41
 Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR II-477. 
42
 Case C-280.08 P Deutsche Telekom Ag v European Commission, Judgment of 14 October 2010 (not yet 
reported).   
43
 Deutsche Telekom (CJEU) at paragraph 182. 
44
 Deutsche Telekom (CJEU) at paragraphs 167-168. 
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principle of legal certainty, insofar as a dominant firm will know its own costs but not those of its 
competitors.45 
 
Thirdly, the Court acknowledged that, in certain circumstances including those of the Deutsche 
Telekom case itself, the only mechanism available to the dominant firm by which to remedy an 
abusive margin squeeze may be to raise retail prices for end-users.  Nonetheless, the Court appears to 
have taken a “lesser-of-two-evils” approach, whereby increased retail prices are acceptable in the 
immediate term in order to protect the existence of competition in the market, on the assumption in 
the longer term the presence of competition would place downward pressure on retail prices once 
again.46  This position is in complete opposition to the approach of the Supreme Court in LinkLine, 
discussed below, where the fear that dominant firms might raise retail prices to avoid a price squeeze 
seems to have been a key factor behind the Court’s highly restrictive approach. 
 
Fourthly, the Court followed the approach of the General Court in Deutsche Telekom in holding that, 
contrary to the arguments of the Commission, it is not sufficient to merely demonstrate the existence 
of a prima facie margin squeeze of as-efficient competitors in order to establish a violation of Article 
102 TFEU.  Additionally, anticompetitive effect must be established, relating to the possible barriers 
which the appellant’s pricing practices could have created for the growth of products on the retail 
market, and therefore, on the degree of competition on the downstream market.  However, the fact 
that a margin squeeze, once implemented, ultimately fails to drive the competitors from the market 
does not alter its categorisation as abusive, where the market penetration of those competitors has 
been made more difficult.47   
 
Finally, the Court considered the impact that sector-specific regulation has on the application of EU 
competition law, and in particular, on the margin squeeze concept.  As noted, the case against DT had 
proceeded on the assumption that did not have any discretion as to the wholesale access prices to be 
charged, which were set by the national regulator, but that it could alter its retail prices provided that 
these remained within the total price cap and that the changes were granted regulatory approval.  In 
assessing the impact of the sectoral regulation, the Court drew a distinction between situations where 
the restriction of competition is wholly attributable to the regulatory regime, and situations where it is 
                                                     
45
 Deutsche Telekom (CJEU) at paragraphs 196-202. 
46
 Deutsche Telekom (CJEU) at paragraphs 181-182.  The Court did not, however, address the dilemma of the 
firm that is dominant but subject to price regulation at the wholesale level, and which faces downward 
competitive prices at the retail level—in particular, the question as to whether such a firm can cut prices to meet 
competition, even if this leads once again to a margin squeeze.  Following the highly restrictive approach 
adopted in the Telefónica decision, it seems unlikely that a dominant firm can invoke the “meeting competition” 
defence to excuse a conscious margin squeeze, even though, in a somewhat circular fashion, it is the existence 
of the prohibition on margin squeeze which, coupled with the wholesale price regulation, has allowed the 
development of competition which drives the reduction in retail prices (Telefónica at paragraphs 637-640).   
47
 Deutsche Telekom (CJEU) at paragraphs 250-254. 
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merely encouraged or facilitated by the regulatory regime, also allowing some scope for autonomous 
conduct by the firm concerned.  Under the former scenario, the competition rules are not applicable, 
because they apply directly only to the conduct of undertakings—essentially a State or regulatory 
compulsion defence.  In the latter case, however, any scope for autonomous behaviour by the relevant 
firm can be examined to determine whether it is in conformity with the competition rules.48  A very 
high threshold for operation of the State compulsion defence in these circumstances was therefore 
established by the Court.  The existence of sector-specific regulation—even relatively intrusive 
regulation, like the mandatory access requirements and dual-level price regulation in place in the 
Deutsche Telekom situation—does not immunise the relevant market from the application of the 
competition rules, unless it has “eliminated any possibility of competitive activity” by the dominant 
firm.49  As DT had the ability to avoid the margin squeeze by raising its price for retail access, its 
failure to do so violated the competition rules.  The existence of sectoral regulation is, however, 
relevant to the determination of the competitive conditions in the market concerned, a factor that 
impacts on the application of the competition rules to the conduct of firms operating in that market.50  
It may also lead to a reduction in fine for the firm, where it is found to be a contributing factor to the 
breach.  The relationship between the margin squeeze concept and sector-specific regulation is 
considered further below in Part IV of this paper. 
 
The TeliaSonera Judgment 
 
The principles established in Deutsche Telekom case have been confirmed and somewhat developed 
in the recent TeliaSonera judgment of the Court of Justice.51  A reference case from Sweden, it 
concerned the application of Article 102 TFEU and the margin squeeze abuse by the Swedish national 
competition authority.  In the absence of a detailed finding of facts, the referring court asked, in 
essence, a series of questions clarifying the parameters of the margin squeeze concept.   
 
The Court of Justice confirmed that margin squeeze constitutes a standalone abuse under Article 102 
TFEU, where the spread between wholesale and retail prices is “negative or insufficient…so that that 
spread does not allow a competitor which is as efficient as [the dominant] undertaking to compete for 
the supply of [retail] services to end users.”52  In such circumstances, an as-efficient competitor of the 
dominant firm would be forced to operate at a loss or “artificially reduced levels of profitability.”53  
Generally, only the costs and revenues of the dominant firm are relevant to this assessment—an 
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 Deutsche Telekom (CJEU) at paragraphs 80-85. 
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 Deutsche Telekom (CFI) at paragraph 90. 
50
 Deutsche Telekom (CJEU) at paragraph 224. 
51
 Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, judgment of 17 February 2011, not yet reported. 
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 TeliaSonera at paragraphs 31-32. 
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 TeliaSonera at paragraph 33. 
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objective standard—although in exceptional circumstances, the costs and prices of its competitors 
might be relevant, for example where it is not possible to identify the cost structure of the dominant 
firm.54  Proof of recoupment of any losses incurred as a result of the margin squeeze is not required,55 
nor is dominance in the downstream market, wholesale dominance being sufficient.56 
 
The Court clarified that the margin squeeze concept can be applied to any pricing practices by 
dominant firms, even in the absence of a regulatory or antitrust duty to deal at the wholesale level.  
Here, the Court diverged from the advice of Advocate General Mazák, who had argued that unless the 
firm has a duty to deal in the first place—either imposed by sectoral regulation or because the 
relatively restrictive Oscar Bronner requirements for the imposition of antitrust forced sharing are 
satisfied57—it cannot be under a distinct duty to deal on particular terms.58  Instead, the Court was of 
the view that where a dominant firm voluntarily chooses to deal with downstream competitors, it 
might be found to abuse its dominant position where the terms of dealing are “disadvantageous” to 
the latter.59  Indispensability of the wholesale input is not, therefore, required for liability.60   
 
On the other hand, the Court followed the approach in Deutsche Telekom by requiring anticompetitive 
effect to be demonstrated in order to establish an abusive margin squeeze.  The Court appears to have 
established a two-part presumption as regards the effects of a squeeze, based on the level of the 
margin between wholesale and resale prices.  Where the margin is negative, an effect which is at least 
potentially exclusionary is probable.  Where the margin remains positive, it has to be demonstrated 
that the application of the pricing practice was (for example, by reason of reduced profitability) likely 
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 TeliaSonera at paragraphs 41-46. 
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 TeliaSonera at paragraphs 96-103. 
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 TeliaSonera at paragraphs 84-89. 
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 Under the criteria set out by the Court of Justice in Oscar Bronner, three conditions must be satisfied before a 
refusal to grant access to an input by a dominant firm can be considered abusive: (i) the refusal must be likely to 
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paragraph 41.  Note that the Court in TeliaSonera, in a rather curious dicta, seems to suggest that even though 
the conduct at issue in Oscar Bronner was considered highly unlikely, on the facts, to amount to an 
anticompetitive refusal to deal, it may have constituted another form of abuse, such as illegal tying (see 
TeliaSonera at paragraph 57). 
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 Opinion of Advocate General Mazák in Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera AB, delivered on 2 
September, at paragraphs 11-30.  Advocate General Mazák argued, persuasively in my view, that absent a 
regulatory duty to deal, there is “no independent competitive harm caused by the margin squeeze above and 
beyond the harm which would result from a duty-to-deal violation at the wholesale level” (paragraph 16).  
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dominant firm’s incentives to invest, as well as the danger that it would most likely remedy a price squeeze 
simply by raising retail prices (paragraph 21).  See also Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, cited fn. 9 above, at 278. 
59
 TeliaSonera at paragraph 55. 
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 Although raised by the Advocate General in his Opinion, the impact of such a rule on the willingness of firms 
to deal with their competitors without regulatory compulsion was not considered by the Court.   
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to make market penetration of competitors more difficult.61  Similarly, while indispensability is not 
required for liability, it is relevant to the assessment of the likely effects of the squeeze.  Thus, where 
the wholesale product is indispensable, potential anticompetitive effects are probable.62  Nonetheless, 
the Court expressly confirmed that the objective justification defence is available, even where a prima 
facie margin squeeze with anticompetitive effects has been established.  The dominant firm has the 
burden of demonstrating that its pricing practice is economically justified in line with the defence.63 
 
The facts of the TeliaSonera reference did not require the Court to consider the application of the 
margin squeeze principle in a regulated sector, and so Deutsche Telekom remains the guiding 
authority on this point.  Yet, the Court in TeliaSonera construed the “special responsibility” of 
dominant firms with respect to margin squeeze so broadly—relating to “the conduct, by commission 
or omission, which that undertaking decides on its own initiative to adopt”64—that in regulated 
sectors it may develop in practice into a variety of “Bad Samaritan” liability.  This point is considered 
further in Part IV below. 
 
Other Recent Commission Activity 
 
Deutsche Telekom and TeliaSonera must now be regarding as providing the most authoritative 
statement of the status of margin squeeze under EU competition law.  However, a number of other 
Commission decisions, plus the approach taken in its Communication of 2009 setting out its 
enforcement priorities with regard to Article 102 TFEU, are worthy of note. 
 
The Commission’s margin squeeze decision against Telefónica,65 the incumbent telecommunications 
operator in Spain, addressed circumstances similar to those of the Deutsche Telekom case.  Telefónica 
was held to have committed an abusive margin squeeze between its retail and wholesale prices for 
high speed internet,66 which were broadly subject to price regulation by a national authority.  The 
Commission expressly declined to apply the Oscar Bronner test of indispensability67 with respect to 
Telefónica’s wholesale products, arguing that this was unnecessary on the facts: there was already in 
place a regulatory duty to supply, and Telefónica’s status as a former State monopoly provider meant 
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 See fn. 56 above. 
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that its ex ante incentives to invest in infrastructure were not at stake.68  While this position has been 
criticised,69 it is in essence confirmed by TeliaSonera’s view that a regulatory or antitrust duty to 
supply is not required for margin squeeze liability.  A fine of €151.875 million was imposed on 
Telefónica for the breach, which included a reduction of 10% to take account of the impact of the 
regulatory regime on its behaviour.70 
 
In the RWE Gas Foreclosure commitment decision,71 the Commission voiced concerns that RWE, the 
vertically integrated German gas company, had maintained an anticompetitive margin squeeze 
between its gas transmission tariffs and its downstream gas supply tariffs.  In addition to the high 
level of the network tariffs charged by RWE, important elements of the network tariffs applied only to 
third part users, creating an asymmetric effect on network access costs.  The case was closed without 
a finding of breach, on the basis of a binding commitment from RWE to divest its existing German 
gas transmission business.  Note that, similarly to Deutsche Telekom, RWE’s obligation to provide 
third party access to its gas transmission network had its origins in the EU gas market liberalisation 
directives.  Given the abridged nature of the commitments procedure, the impact of the regulatory 
framework was not considered in the published decision, but it does provide an example of a margin 
squeeze occurring in a regulated area other than the telecommunications sector. 
 
Mention should also be made of the guidance issued by the Commission in 2009 on the topic of its 
enforcement priorities with respect to the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU.72  In this document, the 
Commission itself adopts a noticeably more restrictive approach to margin squeeze that that evinced 
in the case law.  Margin squeeze is classified as a variety of refusal to deal, and thus is considered 
abusive only where: (i) access to the wholesale product is objectively necessary to compete 
effectively on a downstream market; (ii) refusal to supply is likely to lead to the elimination of 
effective competition on the downstream market; and (iii) the refusal is likely to lead to consumer 
harm.73  The extent to which this policy statement will limit the margin squeeze concept in EU 
competition law is, however, somewhat doubtful.  Firstly, regardless of the Commission’s prior 
views, the far more expansive margin squeeze principles outlined by the Court of Justice in its recent 
cases must be considered as the authoritative statement of the current EU position.  Secondly, the 
Commission itself takes the view that, where there is a regulatory duty supply already in place—
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meaning, in essence, that any damage to investment incentives has already been done—the higher 
refusal to deal standard does not apply.  Rather, what must be shown is simply likelihood of 
anticompetitive foreclosure.74  Given the frequency with which margin squeeze issues have arisen in 
regulated sectors, this may well be the exception that in fact forms the rule. 
 
Margin Squeeze under US Antitrust Law 
 
Although margin squeeze as a standalone antitrust abuse has, arguably, been recognised in US law for 
more than half a century since the seminal decision of the Second Circuit in Alcoa,75 the recent 
decision of the Supreme Court in LinkLine appears to have eliminated the possibility of maintaining a 
independent price squeeze action.  In the following section of the paper, we shall consider the Alcoa 
and LinkLine jurisprudence, in an effort to determine the scope (if any) for margin squeeze actions 
under US antitrust law today. 
 
The Alcoa case 
 
The facts of Alcoa display certain similarities to both the Napier-Brown and Industries des Poudres 
Sphériques cases discussed above, and likewise occurred in an unregulated market.  Alcoa held a 
monopoly in a production of virgin aluminium ingot in the US, which it sold to sheet aluminium 
manufacturers, and it also itself produced sheet aluminium.  Among a series of monopolisation 
offences with which Alcoa was charged was the claim that it “consistently sold ingot at so high a 
price that the “sheet rollers”, who were forced to buy from it, could not pay the expenses of “rolling” 
the “sheet” and make a living profit out of the price at which Alcoa itself sold “sheet”.”76  Judge 
Learned Hand held that, when Alcoa was made aware of the effects of the price squeeze and failed to 
remedy it, it became unlawful under §2 of the Sherman Act.  Where there was evidence of intent, a 
price squeeze in itself could constitute a monopolisation offence: 
That it was unlawful to set the price of “sheet” so low and hold the price of ingot so 
high, seems to us unquestionable, provided…that on this record the price of ingot 
must be regarded as higher than a “fair price”.77    
 
The Alcoa judgment has attracted significant academic and judicial criticism.  This is due, in large 
part, to its references to “fair price” and “living profit” for competitors, which are considered to be 
inconsistent with the more economic approach to antitrust law adopted by the courts in the decades 
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following the decision. Bork criticised the judgment on the basis that it sought “to trade off consumer 
welfare for unarticulated social values.”78  LinkLink relegates Alcoa to a footnote, taking that view 
that the more recent (and far more restrictive) precedents in Trinko and Brooke Group were “more 
pertinent” in light of “developments in economic theory and antitrust jurisprudence since Alcoa”—
even though neither of those cases, on the facts, dealt with price squeeze issues.79   
 
A key criticism in LinkLine of the Alcoa price squeeze principle is the alleged difficulty of 
determining whether a margin is fair or adequate on the facts of a case.  However, the test articulated 
by Judge Hand in Alcoa in fact amounts to a simplified form of the as-efficient competitor test found 
in EU law, also referred to as the “transfer price test” in US case law.80  The administrability of the as-
efficient competitor test in practice may be debatable, particularly in view of the difficulties of 
apportioning the costs of a vertically integrated firm;81 nonetheless, there is a clear precedent within 
US antitrust for its use.  As LinkLine demonstrates, this precedent has not been followed and its status 
as good law must be regarded as questionable in the circumstances. 
 
The LinkLine Judgment 
 
The facts of the LinkLine case are remarkably similar to those of Deutsche Telekom and Telefonica, 
relating to local loop unbundling under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.82  LinkLine purchased 
wholesale DSL transport services from AT&T, the owner of the local fixed telecommunications 
network throughout much of California, and both LinkLink and AT&T provided downstream retail 
DSL services to end users on the network.  AT&T had a regulatory duty to deal with LinkLine, 
enforced by the sectoral regulator, the Federal Communications Commission; it does not appear to 
have been subject to price regulation at either the wholesale or retail levels.  In 2003, LinkLine 
brought an antitrust suit against AT&T, alleging inter alia an anticompetitive price squeeze in 
violation of §2 of the Sherman Act.  AT&T’s motion to dismiss the price squeeze claim was denied 
by both the district court and Ninth Circuit of Appeals, and so the case made it to the Supreme Court 
in 2009.  The principal issue to be decided was whether a price squeeze could constitute a standalone 
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unilateral conduct antitrust offence;83 Chief Justice Roberts, in the majority opinion, held that it could 
not. 
 
The judgment is noteworthy in a number of respects.  Firstly, the notion of an anticompetitive spread 
between wholesale and retail prices, embraced so emphatically by the EU courts, was dismissed 
absolutely in LinkLine.  The primary reason for rejecting the pricing spread concept appears to be 
administrative concerns: 
Recognizing price-squeeze claims would require courts simultaneously to police 
both the wholesale and retail prices to ensure that rival firms are not being squeezed.  
And courts would be aiming at a moving target, since it is the interaction between 
these two prices that may result in a squeeze.84 
 
Thus, a price squeeze may violate the antitrust rules only if there is a refusal to deal at the wholesale 
level (which could encompass a constructive refusal to deal consisting of excessively high rates or 
unduly restrictive or burdensome terms) or predatory pricing at the retail level.  An unfair or 
inadequate margin in itself is not illegal.   
 
Secondly, the restrictive nature of this holding is reinforced by the highly restrictive precedents relied 
upon by the Court to determine the refusal to deal and predatory pricing questions.  After Trinko, 
refusal to deal by a monopolist will be found to violate the antitrust laws only in the most exceptional 
circumstances.85  Similarly, following Brooke Group, a predatory pricing strategy can be impugned 
only where it is shown that (i) the prices charged by the monopolist are below an appropriate measure 
of its costs, and (ii) there is a dangerous probability that the monopolist will be able to recoup its 
“investment” in below-cost prices.86  Moreover, the Supreme Court does not appear to have modified 
in any way the test for predation to take account of the cross-subsidisation aspect of margin squeeze, 
whereby losses at the retail level can be supported with profits at the wholesale level.  As a result, it is 
impossible for a margin in itself to breach the antitrust rules, and highly unlikely that either of the 
constituent prices will breach these rules either. 
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Finally, LinkLine confirmed the approach in Trinko with respect to the effects of sector-specific 
regulation on the application of the antitrust rules, and indeed may have strengthened the de facto 
antitrust immunity for regulatory activity resulting from that judgment.  The Supreme Court in Trinko 
took the view that the existence of a regulatory duty to deal removed any scope for imposing an 
antitrust duty to deal in the market concerned.  Trinko, like LinkLine, concerned the mandatory access 
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which the Trinko Court described as “a good 
candidate for implication of antitrust immunity, to avoid the real possibility of judgments conflicting 
with the agency’s regulatory scheme”.  Nonetheless, the 1996 Act contains an explicit antitrust saving 
clause, which preserves those “claims that satisfy established antitrust standards”.  Thus, in Trinko, 
the Court had to consider whether an antitrust duty to deal could exist in the circumstances: it took the 
view that the extensive provision for access under the 1996 Act made it unnecessary to impose a 
judicial doctrine of forced access under the antitrust rules.  In LinkLine, by contrast, the Court 
interpreted the Trinko precedent as creating a “straightforward” rule, barring any antitrust obligations 
arising in the presence of sectoral regulation.  Notably, both LinkLine and Trinko relied upon a 
judgment of Justice Breyer, given when he was Chief Justice of the First Circuit, in the case of 
Concord v Boston Edison.87  That earlier case concerned an alleged price squeeze by a vertically 
integrated electricity company, which was subject to price regulation at both the wholesale and retail 
levels.  In the judgment, Breyer J considered at length the relationship between competition law and 
regulation, arguing that “where regulatory and antitrust regimes coexist…antitrust analysis must 
sensitively “recognize and reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting” of the regulated industry 
to which it applies.”88  On the question of the alleged price squeeze, Breyer J took the view that: 
…a price squeeze of the sort at issue here does not ordinarily violate Sherman Act, 
§2, where the defendant’s prices are regulated at both the primary and secondary 
levels.  In so holding, we are not saying either that the antitrust laws do not apply in 
this regulatory context, or that they somehow apply less stringently here than 
elsewhere.  Rather, we are saying that, in light of the regulatory rules, constraints, 
and practices, the price squeeze at issue here is not ordinarily exclusionary, and, for 
that reason, it does not violate the Sherman Act.89 
 
Note how the approach of the court in Town of Concord to the question of the antitrust/regulation 
interface differs markedly from the approach in Linkline, even though the Supreme Court in the latter 
decision quoted at length from the earlier decision.  In Town of Concord, antitrust is applied within 
the regulated sector, but the existence of the regulation so impacts upon the relevant market that the 
conduct at issue does not breach the antitrust rules.  By contrast, in LinkLine this ultimate result is 
presumed, so that a per se rule of legality under the antitrust rules is imposed, albeit this is conceived 
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both in Trinko and LinkLine as more of an immunity than a safe harbour.  Nonetheless, the ultimate 
result in Town of Concord, Trinko and LinkLine is the same: the presence of economic regulation 
precludes any finding of breach of the antitrust laws.  This result stands in clear contrast to the 
position in EU law, as confirmed in Deutsche Telekom and TeliaSonera, and it is this question—the 
application of the margin squeeze concept in regulated sectors—that comprises Part IV of this paper. 
 
Before addressing that issue, however, it is worth summarising the differing approaches to margin 
squeeze to be found under current EU and US jurisprudence. 
 
- In the EU, a margin squeeze can constitute a standalone violation of Article 102 TFEU where the 
spread between wholesale and retail prices charged by a vertically integrated firm is negative or 
insufficient to cover the costs incurred by that firm (or its as-efficient competitor) in producing 
the retail product.  There must be dominance at the wholesale but not the retail level and, barring 
exceptional circumstances, the only costs and revenues to focus on are those of the dominant firm 
itself.  It is necessary to demonstrate that the existence of the squeeze makes market penetration 
more difficult for competitors, although where the wholesale product is indispensable and/or the 
spread is negative, anticompetitive effects are considered to be probable. 
 
- In the US, margin squeeze does not constitute a standalone violation of §2 of the Sherman Act.  
Price squeezing behaviour must instead be assessed as a constructive refusal to deal or an instance 
of predatory pricing—with no modification of the existing (and highly restrictive) legal tests for 
these offences to take account of the vertical relationship and possibility of cross-subsidies.  
 
- In the EU, the presence of sector-specific regulation—even intrusive regulation that mandates 
entry and sets prices—does not prevent the application of competition law and the margin squeeze 
concept, provided the vertically integrated firm retained some scope to avoid the squeeze, even if 
it can only do so by raising retail prices.  By contrast, in the US, the ex ante economic regulation 
of a sector appears to remove it from the purview of antitrust, so that only regulatory duties can 
arise and regulatory remedies be imposed. 
 
IV. Margin Squeeze and Economic Regulation 
 
We now consider in greater detail the relationship between the margin squeeze concept and sector-
specific economic regulation.  Both competition law and economic regulation are concerned, broadly, 
with the effective functioning of markets.  However, important differences remain—for example, the 
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mode and temporal aspect of enforcement, as well as the objectives that may be pursued90—so that 
one regime cannot be subsumed within the other without reaching a very high level of generalisation.  
Economic regulation can take a multitude of forms,91 but general, the three key decision variables 
controlled are price, quantity and industry entry or exit.92  Moreover, regulation of one aspect of a 
firm’s operations frequently impacts on the other variables.93  For example, mandatory access 
requirements almost inevitably lead to some form of price regulation for the industry concerned, 
because a right of access or supply will be worthless in practice if the infrastructure owner or supplier 
is permitted to charge an unreasonably high rate that amounts to a constructive refusal to deal with 
competitors.  Similarly, production quotas typically act as a barrier to entry, since potential entrants 
may be prevented from bringing their product onto the market.  In the margin squeeze context, the 
problem is frequently created by a mandatory access requirement at the wholesale level—and 
complicated by price regulation at one or both levels of the price squeeze. 
 
Three preliminary observations are appropriate.  There is, firstly, an asymmetry of liability regarding 
margin squeezes that occur in a regulated sector.  In such circumstances, the margin squeeze cannot 
be caused entirely by the conduct of the vertically regulated firm.  By contrast, the squeeze can be 
caused entirely by the regulator.94  Secondly, regulated markets are typically very far from the 
archetype of atomistic perfect competition that is the model informing the competition rules.  Indeed, 
a margin squeeze in a regulated sector may in fact be evidence of increased competition in the market 
(due to intermodal competition), which in fact may imply that deregulation is appropriate.95  Thirdly, 
and in view of the rather critical approach that this paper takes with respect to the regulated margin 
squeeze as a competition law offence, it should be noted that the concurrent application of 
competition law and regulation is not without its strong defenders.96  Indeed, it has been argued that 
the presence of regulation increases rather than reduces the need for competition law enforcement, 
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insofar as it creates incentives for the regulated (and usually, former monopoly) firm to avoid the 
regulation and seek monopoly rents in new markets.97 
 
The US Approach to the Regulated Margin Squeeze 
 
Under US jurisprudence, the existence of regulation at one or both levels appears to remove that 
element of the squeeze from the purview of competition law.  While the extent to which Trinko in fact 
removes regulated conduct from the purview of competition law is disputed,98 LinkLine articulates a 
clear principle that regulation prevents the relevant prices from being examined even individually 
under the discrete tests for refusal to deal or predation. 
 
The question of whether margin squeeze behaviour should be exempt from the application of the 
competition rules where it is also subject to sector-specific regulation is linked to the broader issue of 
the intersection between competition law and regulation.  The regulatory immunity approach adopted 
in LinkLine has the benefit of clear, ex ante certainty of application for firms and for national 
authorities (regulators and competition agencies).  Moreover, a key assumption of this approach is 
that the competition problem is not irremediable absolutely, insofar as a regulatory remedy generally 
exists—it is simply irremediable via antitrust.  In both Trinko and LinkLine, a regulatory remedy was 
available to address the competition problem, and indeed in Trinko, the incumbent’s behaviour had 
already been investigated and corrected by the sectoral regulator, the FCC.  The availability of 
regulatory remedies appears to have been a significant factor confirming the Supreme Court decision 
in both cases.   
 
Of course, where the regulatory regime does not have the means by which to remedy the margin 
squeeze, excluding the application of competition law in order to remedy the problem creates a lacuna 
in the legal framework.  The question then becomes whether it is appropriate to address regulatory 
problems via competition law mechanisms.  Is the application of the competition rules really a 
suitable vehicle by which to tackle the problem of regulatory capture, for example, to say nothing of 
adverse effects on legal certainty that may result?  A key policy question is whether we accept that 
some competition problems are beyond the reach of competition law—and much comes down to the 
administrability of competition law in the particular regulatory context.99 
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A further question with regard to the regulatory immunity approach is whether immunity should be 
automatic—as was apparently the case in LinkLine—or reached via a deductive reasoning process that 
considers the impact of the regulatory regime on the firm’s behaviour, and in particular, its potential 
to cause anticompetitive harm—as was laid out in Town of Concord.  The former approach has the 
benefit of administrative simplicity, while the latter is arguably the more principled and respectful of 
the jurisdiction of the antitrust rules.  To an extent, however, given that both approaches will arrive at 
the same ultimate conclusion, this is perhaps more of a theoretical question than a practical concern.    
 
The EU Approach to the Regulated Margin Squeeze 
 
In the EU, by contrast, the concurrent application of competition and regulation has been expressly 
approved by both the Commission and the EU courts, and this principle extends to the regulated 
margin squeeze context.  The Commission is strongly of the view that competition rules and sector-
specific regulation form “a coherent regulatory framework” of EU law,100 capable of concurrent 
application and with “mutually reinforcing” effect.101  In Deutsche Telekom, the Court of Justice 
agreed, describing the relationship between the EU competition rules and sector-specific regulation in 
the following terms: 
…the competition rules laid down by the EC Treaty [now Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union] supplement…by an ex post review, the legislative 
framework adopted by the Union legislature for ex ante regulation of the 
telecommunications markets.102 
 
Advocate General Mazák, in his Opinion, in Deutsche Telekom, saw the sector-specific regulation at 
issue in that case and the EU competition law provisions as “complementary”,103 arguing that the 
former “completes the Treaty provisions on competition and should guarantee a competitive context 
to an extent which [the competition rules] alone could not with the same certainty…[the competition 
rules] should be considered to constitute a set of minimum criteria.”104  Competition law and 
regulation remain separate instruments, “even if ultimately they both seek to promote competition”: 
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here, Advocate General Mazák invoked the analogy of two barriers, the distinct requirements of each 
having to be respected on the facts.105 
 
In general terms, there is, first and foremost, a basic legal certainty and fairness problem stemming 
from concurrent application of regulation and competition law.  O’Donoghue argues that the approach 
in Deutsche Telekom shows “a lack of coordinated thinking with respect to the interaction between 
regulation and competition law and, as a result, [has] placed regulated firms in an invidious 
position.”106  Thus, the regulated firm is subject to two sets of legal duties, both imposed by the State, 
with respect to the same market conduct, and compliance with one set of obligations does not 
guarantee that its other obligations have also been satisfied, as the facts of Deutsche Telekom itself 
illustrate.  At a more pragmatic level, there is a risk of duplication of work by enforcers107—which, 
incidentally, appears to be the Commission’s primary concern regarding concurrent 
regulation/competition law enforcement.108 
 
More specifically, in the margin squeeze context, the fact of regulatory price setting means that the 
prices under assessment have not been freely decided upon and implemented by the dominant firm.  
Thus, liability is imposed on the firm, not for its anticompetitive actions, but rather for the 
anticompetitive consequences of its inaction.  It is established in EU law that a dominant firm has a 
“special responsibility” not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the 
Common Market.109  In Deutsche Telekom, the Court of Justice distinguished between “scope” to 
remedy a margin squeeze (where a dominant firm can, directly or indirectly via representations to the 
regulatory price-setter, alter at least one of the parameter of the vertical margin to alleviate the 
squeeze) and “fault” in failing to exercise such scope to remedy, for example intention to foreclose as 
a result.  Once scope has been established, under current EU law there is no additional requirement to 
demonstrate that the firm was at fault in failing to exercise its ability to remedy—the mere omission to 
do so is sufficient to establish margin squeeze liability.110  TeliaSonera now confirms that a margin 
squeeze can be carried out by “commission or omission”.111 
 
A basic issue here is the degree to which a firm subject to detailed regulatory requirements in reality 
has scope to proactively avoid the margin squeeze created by a regulated pricing structure.  In 
Deutsche Telekom, for example, the Court of Justice took the view that the regulation merely 
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encouraged the squeeze identified.  In such circumstances, the dominant firm is expected “to take the 
initiative” and to apply for variation of its regulated prices.112 Consider, however, that the regulation 
at issue involved (i) a mandatory duty to deal; (ii) wholesale prices that were (according to the 
Commission’s case theory) wholly set by the regulator; and (iii) retail prices that were subject to a 
price cap that was steadily decreased over the time period concerned, and in any event retail price 
changes required the permission of the regulator.  To say that DT had genuine scope to alter its prices 
to avoid the scope in these circumstances sets the threshold for a finding of autonomous conduct at a 
nonsensically low level.  At most, DT had a highly circumscribed ability to alter its retail prices, and 
therefore it could touch only one parameter of the anticompetitive spread, a term which on its 
common sense means implies the need for at least two references points.  Yet, the Court refused to 
consider the legality of DT’s retail prices in isolation.113 
 
A deeper problem is that, to hold a dominant firm liable for its omission or failure to lobby for 
changes to the regulatory regime that will benefit solely the balance sheet of its competitors, is in 
effect to establish a “Bad Samaritan” rule, or duty to rescue, in EU competition law.    That is, a firm 
may have breached the competition rules in circumstances where the anticompetitive effects felt on 
the market result from the actions of a third party, namely the regulatory authority that has either set 
or approved the prices for the products concerned, thereby dictating in law the prices that the 
dominant firm must charge.  Thus, the dominant firm will be liable, not for its own conduct—that is, 
charging prices required by law—but rather, for its failure to intervene and prevent the regulator from 
adopting policies that harm the dominant firm’s competitor.114 
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At least two arguments can be advanced against imposing Bad Samaritan liability in the context of a 
regulated margin squeeze.  The first is that, even in civil law jurisdictions, liability of this nature is 
typically imposed only in circumstances where the victim is in imminent danger of serious physical 
harm.  In the regulated margin squeeze context, the harm is diminished profitability or at worst 
bankruptcy for the competing firm; the harm occurs more gradually, usually over numerous or even 
years; and during this period, the competing firm has the opportunity to avoid or mitigate the harm by 
altering its business strategy or itself petitioning the regulator to impose more appropriate wholesale 
and/or retail prices.  The duty to rescue presupposes that, without the rescuer’s intervention, the harm 
will occur, whereas this crucial causal link is missing in the regulated margin squeeze context.  Thus, 
the key normative considerations justifying imposition of liability for omission—serious physical 
harm, lack of alternative options for avoidance, the constrained time frame—are not satisfied with 
respect to a regulated margin squeeze.115 
 
Secondly, the foundational premise of the market system—and thus of competition law, which 
protects the market system—is that individual market operators are rational self-maximisers.116  Given 
that the welfare of society is merely the sum of the welfare of each individual (or firm), economics 
tells us that, somewhat counter-intuitively, when we act in our own best interests we actually act in 
the best interests of society.  While it would go too far to suggest that competition law advocates 
selfishness, it does work from the premise that individual firms should be concerned solely with 
securing their own economic efficiency and success in the market.  For this reason, dominant firms 
are prohibited from using their market power to exclude competitors by recourse to non-normal 
means of competition.  Rather, they can ensure their continued economic success only by competing 
effectively in the marketplace.  A rule that requires a dominant firm to consider, and pro-actively 
protect, the market position of its competitors goes against this fundamental distinction between 
competition on the merits and artificial manipulation of the market that lies at the core of competition 
law theory.  If dominant firms are prohibited from interfering in the market to the detriment of 
competitors, why are they obliged to do so in order to protect their competitors?  Surely, the success 
or otherwise of competing firms should concern the dominant firm only indirectly if at all, insofar as 
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it provides a measure by which to assess the effectiveness of the dominant firm’s own competition 
efforts.  Despite suggestions to the contrary,117 the Commission itself takes the view that in applying 
EU competition law, “what really matters is protecting an effective competitive process and not 
simply protecting competitors.”118  Yet, a principle to the effect that a dominant firm must ensure that 
third parties act in the best interest of its competitors (with the corollary that its own interests are 
likely to be compromised) makes the dominant firm, in effect, its competitors’ keeper.  Moreover, it 
conflicts with the principle that competition—unlike sector-specific regulation—does not impose 
affirmative duties even on dominant firms.119  As for the argument that protecting competitors is one 
means of protecting the competitive process, Geradin & O’Donoghue argue that, while subsidising 
inefficient entry in the short term on the basis that the entrant will become more efficient over time 
may be a legitimate objective under regulatory policy, no such mandate exists under competition 
law.120 
 
The Deutsche Telekom case itself highlights a further problem that can result from a conglomerate 
regulation/antitrust approach in the EU context.  On the facts of the case, DT’s own provision of retail 
access services was in fact loss-making; however, losses due to the below-cost access charges were 
subsidised by higher call charges.  This pricing structure was a result of the historical pricing policy 
pursued by DT in its guise as the State monopoly telecommunications provider, on social policy 
grounds (presumably, to make access affordable, even if service usage costs were high), which DT 
inherited upon privatisation.  That telecommunications tariffs had not yet been rebalanced to a more 
cost-reflective structure stemmed, in reality, from the failure of Germany to implement correctly the 
requirements of the EU telecommunications directives.121  In applying the margin squeeze test, 
however, the Commission proceeded as if tariffs had already been rebalanced by refusing to take 
account of the cross-subsidisation effects from profitable service charges (which both DT and its 
competitors used to make up the access shortfall).  Moreover, DT then duly failed the test, precisely 
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because tariff rebalancing was not yet in place.122  Therefore, by the Commission’s choice to pursue 
DT under the competition rules for the margin squeeze abuse rather than Germany for failure to fulfil 
its EU law obligations under Article 258 TFEU (ex Article 226 EC), arguably the end result is a form 
of horizontal direct effect of the relevant directives, contrary to the established principle of EU law 
prohibiting such a result.123  Note that while Geradin & O’Donoghue have highlighted the “arguably 
greater scope (and need) for intervention on the basis of competition rules in the [EU] than in the 
US” in the context of telecommunications law, on the basis that the latter legislative regime is far 
more detailed and prescriptive than the EU regulatory framework,124 this distinction does not address 
the legal issue of horizontal direct effect, even though it may provide a policy reason supporting 
concurrent application of competition law with the regulatory provisions. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Margin squeeze as a competition law abuse addresses the anticompetitive margin between wholesale 
access prices and end user retail prices charged by a dominant vertically integrated firm.  It is 
recognised as a discrete offence under EU competition law, but can be attacked under US antitrust law 
only by demonstrating that one or both of the price levels, individually, is anticompetitive.  Margin 
squeezes arising in regulated sectors pose a particular problem: to what extent is the pricing behaviour 
attributable to the regulatory regime rather than the dominant firm’s conduct, and does this disconnect 
shield the dominant firm from liability under the competition rules? 
 
Formally, at least, neither EU nor US law contains a bright line rule regarding the application of the 
margin squeeze concept within regulated sectors.  Nonetheless, after Deutsche Telekom, the scope for 
reliance upon the State compulsion defence seems minimal, while in LinkLine antitrust immunity was 
treated as de facto automatic in the presence of sectoral regulation. 
 
In a sense, however, the distinction between the EU and US approaches can be overstated.  Both are 
concerned primarily with preserving competition on the merits in a market, and conversely, avoiding 
conduct that inhibits such beneficial competition.  Where these positions differ is the focus of their 
attentions.  From the EU perspective, protecting competition means attracting and keeping rivals (that 
is, firms other than the vertically integrated firm) in the market.125  From the US perspective, this 
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means protecting the incentives that the vertically integrated firm itself has to compete, for example 
by investing in more efficient technology and cutting its retail prices.  As to whether, from an 
economic standpoint, one approach is superior to the other, it is difficult to say with much certainty. 
 
Given the strong industrial policy flavour that permeates the Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica 
decisions—the key objective of development of the information society in the EU—there is perhaps 
an argument that the margin squeeze concept developed in that line of case law should be confined to 
its facts.126  However, the TeliaSonera case, even though it concerns an alleged margin squeeze in the 
same (telecommunications) sector, draws the parameters of the margin squeeze concept in such a 
broad manner, and of such general application, that it appears to limit the scope for any such 
restrictive interpret.  For the moment, therefore, the margin squeeze concept under EU competition is 
far from a principle in danger of being narrowed out of existence. 
 
As for the US approach, given contemporary policy arguments in favour of reregulation (or at least 
better regulation) in many sectors, the question is whether the automatic regulatory immunity afforded 
in LinkLine will be challenged going forward, given that the expansion of economic regulation will 
result in a correlating elimination of antitrust.  In both jurisdictions, therefore, we must await further 
developments before the scope of the margin squeeze concept can be determined definitely.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
consumers” (Telefónica at paragraph 557).  See also Telefónica at paragraph 586: “The establishment of 
foreclosure effects does not mean that rivals are forced to exit the market: it is sufficient that rivals are 
disadvantaged and consequently led to compete less aggressively.”   
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 See also C. Cavaleri Rudaz, “Did Trinko Really Kill Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims? A Critical Approach to 
the LinkLine Decision through a Comparison of E.U. and U.S. Case Law” (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1077, at 1119. 
